Managing Deliberation: The Quandary of Democratic Dialogue by Post, Robert C
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Robert Post 
Some of our best and most influential constitutional scholars have 
recently revived the view that the essential objective of the First 
Amendment is to promote a rich and valuable public debate. Their 
claim is that First Amendment issues ought to be decided not by "refer- 
ence to ... personal autonomy, or the right of self-expression" but, 
rather, by reference to the Amendment's "positive purpose of creating 
an informed public capable of self-government."' Because this under- 
standing of the First Amendment subordinates individual rights of 
expression to collective processes of public deliberation, I shall call it 
the "collectivist" theory of the First Amendment. 
Moved by the disreputable state of contemporary democratic dia- 
logue in America, proponents of the collectivist theory of the First 
Amendment have used the theory to advance a powerful reform 
agenda, ranging from statutes designed to correct the corrosive effects 
of private wealth on elections to legislation calculated to free the mar- 
ketplace of ideas from the distorting effects of large media oligopolies. 
The Supreme Court has been largely hostile to this agenda, objecting 
to its tendency to achieve its purposes through the suppression of 
individual speech. Thus in Buckley v. Valeo the Court struck down 
limitations on independent campaign expenditures, stating that "the 
concept that government may restrict he speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
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foreign to the First Amendment."2 And in Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo the Court sought to protect a private and independent 
sphere of editorial autonomy by striking down a Florida statute provid- 
ing candidates a right of reply when attacked by the press.3 
Advocates of the collectivist heory of the First Amendment view 
these decisions as misguided, because they invoke private rights of 
speech to circumscribe government efforts to enhance public debate. 
The touchstone of constitutional analysis should rather be, as Cass 
Sunstein has written in a recent article, what "will best promote demo- 
cratic deliberation."4 Instead of fetishizing private rights, the Court 
should engage in a nuanced, contextualized, and pragmatic inquiry. 
Owen Fiss has offered the most thorough and comprehensive 
articulation of the collectivist heory. According to Fiss, the Supreme 
Court has been enthralled by a "Free Speech Tradition" that is wrongly 
focused on "the protection of autonomy."5 It has thus failed to "see 
that the key to fulfilling the ultimate purposes of the first amendment 
is not autonomy ... but rather the actual effect" of speech: "On the 
whole does it enrich public debate? Speech is protected when (and 
only when) it does, and precisely because it does, not because it is an 
exercise of autonomy. In fact autonomy adds nothing, and if need be, 
might have to be sacrificed, to make certain that public debate is 
sufficiently rich to permit true collective self-determination. What the 
phrase 'the freedom of speech' in the first amendment refers to is a 
social state of affairs, not the action of an individual or institution."6 
This is a characteristically clear and succinct statement of the 
central premise of the collectivist theory: the criterion for constitu- 
tional analysis ought to be whether public debate is "sufficiently rich" 
to enable "true collective self-determination," and this criterion is ana- 
lytically independent of the value of autonomy.7 Once this premise is 
2. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976). See First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978); Meyer v. Grant, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981). But 
see Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). 
3. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See L. A. Powe, 
Jr., "Tornillo," Supreme Court Review (1987), pp. 345-96, pp. 380-85. But see Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
4. Cass R. Sunstein, "Preferences and Politics," Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 
(1991): 3-34, p. 28. 
5. Owen Fiss, "Free Speech and Social Structure," Iowa Law Review 71 (1986): 
1405-25, pp. 1408-11. 
6. Ibid., p. 1411. For a survey of literature making similar arguments in the context 
of campaign financing, see Lillian R. B. BeVier, "Money and Politics: A Perspective on 
the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform," California Law Review 73 (1985): 
1045-90, pp. 1068-74. 
7. Fiss writes: "We should learn to recognize the state not only as an enemy, but 
also as a friend of speech; like any social actor, it has the potential to act in both 
capacities, and, using the enrichment of public debate as the touchstone, we must begin 
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granted, the collectivist heory of speech presents a cogent and power- 
ful argument for revising traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. 
The question I wish to explore in this article is whether, and if 
so under what conditions, this premise can be rendered constitution- 
ally coherent. 
I 
The most influential exposition of the collectivist theory of the First 
Amendment is by the philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn; his work 
continues to inspire and guide the theory's modern advocates. Because 
of its candid and uncompromising exploration of the theory's assump- 
tions and implications, Meiklejohn's work offers an especially clear 
revelation of the theory's essential constitutional structure. 
A 
Meiklejohn anchors the First Amendment firmly to the value of self- 
government: "The primary purpose of the First Amendment is ... 
that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which 
bear upon our common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no 
doubt, no belief, no counterbelief, no relevant information, may be 
kept from them. Under the compact upon which the Constitution 
rests, it is agreed that men shall not be governed by others, that 
they shall govern themselves."8 Meiklejohn locates the essence of self- 
government, and therefore also "the final aim" of First Amendment 
freedom, in democracy's effort o ensure "the voting of wise decisions."9 
He sharply distinguishes this purpose from that of individual au- 
tonomy. 
The First Amendment, Meiklejohn writes, "has no concern about 
the 'needs of many men to express their opinions"'; it provides instead 
for "the common needs of all the members of the body politic."'0 
This orientation toward the needs of the collectivity, rather than the 
to discriminate between them.... The approach I am advocating is not concerned with 
the speaker's autonomy, real or effective, but with the quality of public debate. It is 
listener oriented" ("Free Speech and Social Structure," pp. 1416, 1417). 
8. Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 75. Compare Holmes: "Competition 
among would-be policymakers ... is justified by the education of speakers and listeners 
in the practice of democratic government and by the expectation that public learning 
will occur so that collective decisions will be better (more intelligent, better informed) 
than decisions made without benefit of debate" (p. 32). 
9. Meiklejohn, p. 26. 
10. Ibid., p. 55. Meiklejohn thus attacks Zechariah Chafee, Jr., for having been 
"misled by his inclusion of an individual interest within the scope of the First Amend- 
ment" (p. 57), and he faults Oliver Wendell Holmes for his "excessive individualism" 
(p. 61). 
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individual, underlies one of Meiklejohn's most quoted aphorisms: 
"What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything 
worth saying shall be said."" In Meiklejohn's view, the ultimate pur- 
pose of the First Amendment is to guard against "the mutilation" of 
"the thinking process of the community," not to protect the rights of 
persons to self-expression.'2 
Meiklejohn's account of the First Amendment requires a standard 
by which the quality of the thinking process of the community can be 
assessed. How otherwise could it be known whether public discourse 
is actually meeting "the common needs of all the members of the body 
politic"? How else could it be determined if "everything worth saying" 
has been said, or if some particular regulation of speech "mutilates," 
rather than advances, democratic deliberation? 
Meiklejohn does not flinch from the responsibility of providing 
such a standard. He proposes "the traditional American town meeting" 
as "a model" for the measurement of the quality of public debate.'3 
Meiklejohn argues that the town meeting "is not a Hyde Park"; it is 
not a scene of "unregulated talkativeness."'4 It is rather "a group of 
free and equal men, cooperating in a common enterprise, and using 
for that enterprise responsible and regulated discussion."' 5 The ob- 
jective of the enterprise is "to act upon matters of public interest,",16 
and speech is routinely and necessarily regulated so as to attain that 
objective: 
For example, it is usually agreed that no one shall speak unless 
"recognized by the chair." Also, debaters must confine their re- 
marks to "the question before the house." If one man "has the 
floor," no one else may interrupt him except as provided by the 
rules. The meeting has assembled, not primarily to talk, but 
primarily by means of talking to get business done. And the 
talking must be regulated and abridged as the doing of the busi- 
ness under actual conditions may require. If a speaker wanders 
from the point at issue, if he abuses or in other ways threatens 
to defeat the purpose of the meeting, he may be and should be 
declared "out of order." He must then stop speaking, at least in 
that way. And if he persists in breaking the rules, he may be 
"denied the floor" or, in the last resort, "thrown out" of the 
meeting. The town meeting, as it seeks for freedom of public 
discussion, would be wholly ineffectual unless speech were 
thus abridged.'7 
11. Ibid., p. 26. 
12. Ibid., p. 27. 
13. Ibid., p. 24. 
14. Ibid., pp. 25, 26. 
15. Ibid., p. 25. 
16. Ibid., p. 24. 
17. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 
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Meiklejohn explicitly describes the town meeting as having a struc- 
ture of authority that I have elsewhere characterized as "managerial."'8 
The meeting is regarded as an instrumental organization designed to 
achieve important and specific social ends, and its rules and regulations 
are deemed constitutionally justified insofar as they are necessary for 
the attainment of these ends. For Meiklejohn the purpose of the meet- 
ing is "to act upon matters of public interest," and all facets of the 
meeting, including the speech of its participants, can be legally ar- 
ranged so as to realize that objective. Meiklejohn is quite clear that 
"the talking must be regulated and abridged as the doing of the busi- 
ness under actual conditions may require." The quality of public de- 
bate, therefore, is to be measured by its capacity to facilitate public 
decision making. 
This criterion makes sense within the context of a town meeting. 
Participants in the meeting share "a common enterprise" and hence 
a common derivative understanding of the purpose and function of 
the regulatory standards by which the enterprise will be advanced. 
There is general agreement about such fundamental questions as the 
methods for setting the meeting's agenda, the procedures for govern- 
ing debate within the meeting, the criteria for distinguishing relevant 
from irrelevant speech, and so forth. In this antecedent agreement 
lies the source of the moderator's constitutional authority to enforce 
rules of procedure by controlling speech within the "structured situa- 
tion" of the meeting,'9 even to the extent of "denying the floor" to 
those who persistently refuse to accept the moderator's authority. 
Meiklejohn does not theorize this agreement; he assumes it. Or, 
to be more precise, he assumes the institutional structure of the town 
meeting in which it lies embedded. In fact the very form of a town 
meeting derives from shared assumptions of function and procedure; 
they give the meeting its shape and order and distinguish it from the 
"unregulated talkativeness" of "a Hyde Park." These assumptions thus 
stand in a position analytically distinct from, and prior to, any substan- 
tive decisions the town meeting might reach. The meeting is free to 
resolve as it wishes items properly presented for decision, but it is not 
free to abandon the shared assumptions of function and procedure 
that constitute it as a town meeting. 
Meiklejohn views the town meeting as a model for public discourse 
because he conceptualizes democratic dialogue as serving the function 
18. Robert C. Post, "Between Governance and Management: The History and 
Theory of the Public Forum," UCLA Law Review 34 (1987): 1713-1835. 
19. White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1990). White reaches 
the correct but seemingly paradoxical conclusion that a town meeting is not a "public 
forum" for First Amendment purposes (see Post, "Between Governance and Manage- 
ment," pp. 1799-1800). 
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of facilitating "the voting of wise decisions." He sees the exercise of 
democracy as analogous to an enormous town meeting. He thus im- 
ports into his conception of democracy a dichotomy between the sub- 
stance of public decisions and the shared understandings of function 
and procedure that are analytically distinct from, and prior to, the 
content of specific public decisions. The consequence of this dichotomy 
is that for Meiklejohn the content of government decisions remains 
open for the determination of citizens, but the framework of demo- 
cratic decision making remains fixed and beyond the reach of citizen 
self-government. It is precisely on this point, on the range and mean- 
ing of self-government, that traditional First Amendment jurispru- 
dence differs significantly from Meiklejohn. 
B 
Every interpretation of traditional First Amendment doctrine is of 
course contestable, but there is little dispute that one of the most 
important themes of that doctrine is the amendment's function "as 
the guardian of our democracy."20 The amendment, of course, serves 
to limit majoritarian enactments, so "democracy" cannot in this context 
be equated with majoritarianism. In fact majoritarianism, from the 
perspective of traditional First Amendment doctrine,2' is merely a 
mechanism for decision making that we adopt to reflect the deeper 
value of self-government, which in turn rests on "the distinction be- 
tween autonomy and heteronomy: democratic forms of government 
are those in which the laws are made by the same people to whom 
they apply (and for that reason they are autonomous norms), while 
in autocratic forms of government the law-makers are different from 
those to whom the laws are addressed (and are therefore heterono- 
mous norms)."22 What it means for laws to be "made" by the "same 
people to whom they apply" is not easy to understand. If, with Rous- 
seau, we postulate a determinate fusion of individual and collective 
will, the difficulty dissolves. But the postulate is unconvincing under 
modern conditions of heterogeneity. 
Traditional First Amendment doctrine, and a broad spectrum of 
modern political theories, meet this difficulty by locating the normative 
essence of democracy in the opportunity to participate in the formation 
of the "will of the community" through "a running discussion between 
20. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982). See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 
147, 161 (1939); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 369 (1931). 
21. And, I might add, from the perspective of constitutional aw generally. See 
Robert C. Post, "Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social 
Form," NOMOS XXXV: Democratic Community (1993), in press. 
22. Norberto Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship, trans. P. Kennealy (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 137. 
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majority and minority."23 On this account, democracy attempts to rec- 
oncile individual autonomy with collective self-determination by subor- 
dinating governmental decision making to communicative processes 
sufficient o instill in citizens a sense of participation, legitimacy, and 
identification.24 Although citizens may not agree with all legislative 
enactments, although there may be no determinate fusion of individ- 
ual and collective will, citizens can nevertheless embrace the govern- 
ment as rightfully "their own" because of their engagement in these 
communicative processes. Following Supreme Court precedent, I 
shall use the term 'public discourse' to refer to these communicative 
processes.25 
Conceiving public discourse in this way has two important implica- 
tions. First, censorship of public discourse must be understood as ex- 
cluding those affected from access to the medium of collective self- 
determination. They are thus cut off from participation in the enter- 
prise of autonomous self-government. The fundamental democratic 
project of replacing the "unilateral respect of authority by the mutual 
respect of autonomous wills" is pro tanto circumscribed.26 
Second, public discourse must be conceptualized as an arena 
within which citizens continuously and freely reconcile their differ- 
ences to (re)construct a distinctive and ever-changing national identity. 
Building on the work of Charles Taylor, we might define a "national 
identity" in this context as an orientation in "moral space," a framework 
within which we "can try to determine from case to case what is good, 
or valuable, or what ought to be done."27 We commonly ground gov- 
ernment regulation of behavior on specific visions of national identity. 
But if the state attempts to use such visions to censor public discourse, 
if the state excludes communicative contributions on the grounds of 
a specific sense of what is good or valuable, the state then stands in 
contradiction to the central project of collective self-determination. It
23. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. A. Wedberg (New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1961), pp. 284-88. See, e.g., Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: 
Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 
p. 136; Corliss Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey (New York: Horizon, 1959), p. 58; 
Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy 
(Boston: Beacon, 1979), p. 186; Frank Michelman, "Law's Republic," Yale Law Journal 
97 (1988): 1493-1537, pp. 1526-27. 
24. The discussion of the relationship between self-government and traditional 
First Amendment doctrine in this and the following paragraph is developed at length 
in Robert C. Post, "Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment," William and 
Mary Law Review 32 (1991): 267-327, pp. 279-88. 
25. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988). 
26. The quotation in text is from Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, 
trans. M. Gabain (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948), p. 366. 
27. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 27-28. 
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displaces that project for the sake of heteronomously imposed norms. 
The internal logic of self-government hus implies that with regard 
to the censorship of speech the state must act as though the meaning 
of collective identity were perpetually indeterminate within the me- 
dium of public discourse, where the "debate as to what is legitimate 
and what is illegitimate" must "necessarily" remain "without any guar- 
antor and without any end."28 
Meiklejohn's model of the town meeting, however, precisely vio- 
lates this necessary indeterminacy of public discourse. While acknowl- 
edging that "the voting of wise decisions" must be kept free from 
government interference, it nevertheless authorizes the censorship 
of public discourse on the basis of assumptions about function and 
procedure. Meiklejohn cannot appeal to a distinction between sub- 
stance and procedure to justify this contraction of the scope of demo- 
cratic self-government, for the procedural assumptions he wishes to 
enforce, no less than substantive ones, are ultimately grounded upon 
a distinctive and controversial conception of collective identity. His 
paradigm of the town meeting specifically presupposes that the func- 
tion of American democracy is to achieve an orderly, efficient, and 
rational dispatch of common business, and it consequently implies 
that aspects of public discourse incompatible with that function are 
constitutionally expendable. To the extent public discourse is thus 
truncated, a particular concept of national identity is placed beyond 
the reach of the communicative processes of self-determination. 
The difficulty with Meiklejohn's analysis, therefore, is that it re- 
flects an insufficiently radical conception of the reach of self-determi- 
nation, which encompasses not merely the substance of collective deci- 
sions but also the procedures that facilitate collective decision making. 
Kenneth Karst noted long ago that the "state lacks 'moderators' who 
can be trusted to know when 'everything worth saying' has been said."29 
The state lacks such moderators because the very standards necessary 
to distinguish "relevant" from "irrelevant" speech (or "original" from 
"repetitious" speech, or "orderly" from "disorderly" speech, or even 
"rational" from "irrational" speech) are themselves matters of potential 
28. Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. D. Macey (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 39. 
29. Kenneth L. Karst, "Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment," 
University of Chicago Law Review 43 (1975): 20-68, p. 40. Karst writes that "even the 
repetition of speech conveys the distinctive message that an opinion is widely shared," 
which is of "great importance in an 'other-directed' society where opinion polls are self- 
fulfilling prophecies" (p. 40). Compare Meiklejohn: "If, for example, at a town meeting, 
twenty like-minded citizens have become a 'party,' and if one of them has read to the 
meeting an argument which they have all approved, it would be ludicrously out of 
order for each of the others to insist on reading it again. No competent moderator 
would tolerate that wasting of the time available for free discussion" (p. 26). 
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dispute.30 Conflicts about these standards are matters for debate within 
public discourse. To use a particular version of these standards to 
censor public discourse would be, pro tanto, heteronomously to fore- 
close the open-ended search for collective self-definition. 
The same point can be made with respect to the agenda-setting 
mechanisms of a town meeting. Public control over the presentation 
and characterization of issues within a town meeting seems unprob- 
lematic because of a shared agreement concerning efficient institu- 
tional function and procedure. But within democratic life generally 
such agreement cannot be assumed without concomitantly diminish- 
ing the arena for self-determination. This is because "political conflict 
is not like an intercollegiate debate in which the opponents agree in 
advance on the definition of the issues": "As a matter of fact, the 
definition of the alternatives i the supreme instrument ofpower.... He who 
determines what politics is about runs the country, because the defini- 
tion of the alternatives is the choice of conflicts, and the choice of 
conflicts allocates power."' The state cannot control the agenda of 
public discourse,32 or the presentation and characterization of issues 
within public discourse, because such control would necessarily cir- 
cumscribe the potential for collective self-determination. 
These elementary examples can be given general theoretical for- 
mulation. Managerial structures necessarily presuppose objectives that 
are unproblematic and hence that can be used instrumentally to regu- 
late domains of social life. The enterprise of public discourse, by con- 
trast, rests on the value of autonomy, which requires that all possible 
objectives, all possible versions of national identity, be rendered prob- 
lematic and open to inquiry. No particular objective can justify the 
coercive censorship of public discourse without simultaneously contra- 
dicting the enterprise of self-determination. As a consequence, public 
discourse always appears intolerably formless and incoherent to those 
who care about the instrumental accomplishment of particular pur- 
poses, whether they be the voting of wise decisions or the maintenance 
of rational debate. Public discourse seems to them to consist merely 
of "a Hyde Park" filled with "unregulated talkativeness." 
30. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, "Boundaries and Reasons: Freedom of Expression 
and the Subordination of Groups," University of Illinois Law Review (1990), pp. 95-149; 
Robert C. Post, "Cultural Heterogenity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the 
First Amendment," California Law Review 76 (1988): 297-335, pp. 308-10, and "The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Delibera- 
tion, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell," Harvard Law Review 103 (1990): 601-86. 
31. E. E. Schattshneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in 
America (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 68. 
32. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 530, 538 
(1980): "To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate 
would be to allow that government control over the search for political truth." 
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Justice Harlan captured this aspect of public discourse in Cohen v. 
California. He observed that democratic dialogue "may often appear 
to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance."33 
But Harlan understood that this disorder, this "verbal cacophony," is 
merely a "necessary side effect" of the fact that, "in a society as diverse 
and populous as ours," public discourse is organized not to accomplish 
anything in particular but, instead, to serve as a medium within which 
heterogeneous versions of collective identity continuously collide 
and reconcile.34 
Self-determination, we might say, is something that happens within 
public discourse; there is no external Archimedean point from which 
it can be compelled or its outcome anticipated. We can decide, within 
public discourse, to form and set in motion specific organizations of 
order and instrumental rationality, like town meetings. But it would 
be a grave mistake to confuse these discrete institutions with the sea 
of tumult and discord that is public discourse itself. 
II 
Meiklejohn's work displays a structure of analysis that is common to 
all versions of the collectivist theory of the First Amendment. The 
theory postulates a specific "objective" for public discourse, and it 
concludes that public debate should be regulated to achieve this objec- 
tive. The objective thus stands distinct from, and prior to, any process 
of self-determination that happens within public discourse. The collec- 
tivist theory, therefore, stands for the subordination of public dis- 
course to a framework of managerial authority. 
The structure of analysis is plainly visible in the work of Owen 
Fiss, a profound and influential modern exponent of the collectivist 
theory. Fiss writes that "the larger political purposes" of the First 
Amendment are to establish a "rich public debate."35 He accordingly 
views the "protection of autonomy" as "instrumental" for enhancing 
"the quality of public discourse."36 "Autonomy may be protected, but 
only when it enriches public debate."37 If autonomy does not fulfill 
this function, then "we as a people will never truly be free" until the 
state is constitutionally empowered to "restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others."38 
33. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971). 
34. Ibid. 
35. Owen M. Fiss, "Why the State?" Harvard Law Review 100 (1987): 781-94, 
p. 785. 
36. Ibid., pp. 785-86. 
37. Ibid., p. 786. 
38. Fiss, "Free Speech and Social Structure," p. 1425. 
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Thus Fiss, like Meiklejohn, would use governmental power to 
censor speakers whose expression is deemed incompatible with the 
achievement of a rich and informative public dialogue. He is willing 
to deny these speakers access to the processes of democratic self-gov- 
ernment because he desires to fashion a public dialogue capable of 
empowering "people to vote intelligently and freely, aware of all the 
options and in possession of all the relevant information."39 Fiss wants 
this goal to be managerially imposed upon public discourse by the 
state. He believes that objections to such managerial authority flow 
from a misplaced concern with individual autonomy, from a misguided 
effort to erect "a zone of noninterference ... around" the speech of 
"each individual."40 
What Fiss apparently does not recognize, however, is that the 
value of individual autonomy underlies the very aspiration for self- 
government that propels his own proposed revision of First Amend- 
ment doctrine. Fiss plainly sees that First Amendment jurisprudence 
must provide for "the essential preconditions for an effective democ- 
racy" and that "democracy promises collective self-determination."4' 
Yet his analysis extends the logic of self-determination only to the 
content of democratic decisions, and it withholds that logic from the 
procedural framework of democratic decision making. Like Mei- 
klejohn, Fiss conceptualizes his framework as exogenous to public 
discourse and hence as subject to majoritarian control. Fiss is therefore 
vulnerable to the same critique that we have already applied to 
Meiklejohn. 
"Collective identity is created by and perpetuated through public 
discourse," and different conceptions of collective identity will imply 
different standards for measuring the quality of public debate.42 Fiss 
believes that public discourse is subject to a "distorting influence" 
when its quality is measured according to the criteria of the ambient 
structure of the capitalist market.43 But Fiss believes this because he 
has a particular orientation in "moral space," a framework within which 
39. Ibid., p. 1410. 
40. Fiss, "Why the State?" p. 785. 
41. Fiss, "Free Speech and Social Structure," p. 1407. Thus Fiss writes: "The duty 
of the state is to perserve the integrity of public debate ... to safeguard the conditions 
for true and free collective self-determination" (p. 1416). See Fiss, "State Activism and 
State Censorship," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 2087-2106: "The principle of freedom 
that the First Amendment embodies is derived from the democratic nature of our society 
and reflects the belief that robust public debate is an essential precondition for collective 
self-determination" (pp. 2087-88). 
42. The quotation in text is taken from Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past: 
Essays on the State and the Constitution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 
p. 9. 
43. Fiss, "Why the State?" p. 790. Also: "To be a consumer, even a sovereign one, 
is not to be a citizen" (ibid., p. 788). 
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he can distinguish the "distorted" from the normal.44 To use the coer- 
cive power of the state to suppress public discourse on the basis of Fiss's 
particular vision of national identity would be to decide in advance the 
very issue of collective identity that public discourse is meant to be 
the means of resolving. 
What follows from this analysis is not that public discourse can 
never be regulated but that it ought not to be managed in ways that 
contradict its democratic purpose. This purpose need not preclude 
"time, place and manner regulations" that function as "rules of the 
road" to coordinate and facilitate expression within public discourse. 
Nor need it rule out government action designed to supplement or 
augment communications within public discourse, as for example by 
establishing state-supported forums to enhance public debate.45 But 
the democratic function of public discourse is inconsistent with govern- 
ment regulations that suppress speech within public discourse for the 
sake of imposing a specific version of national identity. 
Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence uses the ideal of au- 
tonomy to insulate the process of self-determination from such pre- 
emption. The protection of individual autonomy prevents the state 
from violating the central democratic aspiration to create a communi- 
cative structure dedicated to "the mutual respect of autonomous wills." 
And this structure, which Fiss can explain only as a vestigial remnant 
of an earlier era of 'Jeffersonian democracy,"46 in turn safeguards 
from government invasion the pervasive indeterminacy of public dis- 
course.47 Traditional First Amendment doctrine guarantees that demo- 
cratic dialogue will remain continuously available to the potential con- 
44. Thus Fiss would have the state regulate speech by means of decisions that "are 
analogous to the judgments made by the great teachers of the universities of this nation 
every day of the week" ("State Activism and State Censorship," p. 2101). But it is 
deeply inconsistent with democratic legitimacy to conceive citizens as the pupils of their 
government, in part because the student/teacher elationship is inherently managerial 
(see Post, "Racist Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment," pp. 317-25). A great 
educator defines her educational mission in terms of what she conceives to be best for 
her students. But democracy conceives its citizens not as pupils to be guided by a 
beneficent state but as free and independent persons capable and determined to decide 
their own destiny. 
45. It is true that such government action may influence national identity, and it 
is also true that at some point such action may become so pervasive or inescapable as 
to amount to governmental imposition of a state-authorized version of national identity. 
At that point, and for that reason, traditional First Amendment jurisprudence would 
be relevant to the assessment of such government action. 
46. Fiss, "Why the State?" p. 786. 
47. Thus, e.g., the many First Amendment decisions prohibiting restrictions on 
public discourse because speech is "offensive" (Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 
[1971]), or "outrageous" (Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 [1988]), or 
because it affronts "dignity" or is "insulting" or causes "public odium" or "public dis- 
repute" (Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 3165, 322 [1988]), both protect the individual auton- 
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tributions of its individual participants. Autonomy, properly 
understood, signifies that within the sphere of public discourse and 
with regard to the suppression of speech the state must always regard 
collective identity as necessarily open-ended. 
The ideal of autonomy essentially distinguishes First Amendment 
jurisprudence from other areas of constitutional aw, which are most 
often associated with specific visions of collective identity. For example 
in the domain of Equal Protection, with which Fiss is most famously 
associated, the federal government has for the past forty years aggres- 
sively sought to inculcate particular national values of equality. But 
legal imposition of these values acquires democratic legitimacy pre- 
cisely because the First Amendment has already established an arena 
of public discourse within which they can be freely embraced or re- 
jected. So far from vestigial, then, the ideal of autonomy is instead 
foundational for the democratic project.48 
III 
Many who practice empirical political science would no doubt object 
to the identification of democracy with the value of autonomous self- 
government.49 But within the world of constitutional aw this identifi- 
cation stands virtually unchallenged, perhaps because of the absence 
of serious alternative normative accounts of democracy. Indeed, the 
principle "that the American people are politically free insomuch as 
they are governed by themselves collectively" is one "that no earnest, 
non-disruptive participant in American constitutional debate is quite 
free to reject."50 
omy of the speaker and simultaneously preclude the state from subordinating public 
discourse to the civility rules of any particular community understanding of public 
life. For a full discussion, see Post, "The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse," 
pp. 626-61. 
48. This of course implies that our national identity does have determinate content 
which includes a commitment to the value of autonomy. But the peculiar consequence 
of the value of autonomy is to require that a public communicative space be generated 
within which government is precluded from enforcing specific concepts of national 
identity. In that space, as Justice Brandeis observed, democracy "substitutes elf-restraint 
for external restraint" (letter from Justice Louis Brandeis to Robert Walter Bruere, 
February 25, 1922, Letters of Louis D. Brandeis, ed. Melvin I. Urofsky and David W. Levy 
[Albany: SUNY Press, 1978], 5:46). I have elsewhere argued that democracy always 
presupposes an antecedent but unenforceable community commitment to the value of 
self-determination ("Between Democracy and Community"). I have also argued that the 
enterprise of constitutional interpretation, including the interpretation of the First 
Amendment, presupposes a similar structure of antecedent community commitments 
(see "Theories of Constitutional Interpretation," in Law and the Order of Culture, ed. 
R. Post [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991], pp. 13-41). 
49. See, e.g.,Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1950). 
50. Michelman, p. 1500. 
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There are, of course, vast disparities between the dreary realities 
of American politics and the aspirational principle of self-determina- 
tion. The extent to which our public discourse actually functions to 
instill participation, legitimacy, and identification is highly debatable.5' 
Participants in the American constitutional tradition are thus forced 
to choose. They can either abandon the principle of self-determination 
and proffer a new and more convincing normative account of democ- 
racy, or they can propose reforms that will enable the principle of 
self-determination to be more effectively realized in American society. 
Proponents of the collectivist theory have uniformly chosen the 
latter option. Their reform agenda is explicitly designed to further 
the value of self-governance. Exemplary is the work of Cass Sunstein, 
who in a recent article has argued that "the First Amendment is funda- 
mentally aimed at protecting democratic self-government," which he 
understands to be a structure of "deliberation" designed to place "gov- 
erning authority in the people themselves."52 But because Sunstein 
believes that the value of "private autonomy" is logically distinct from 
democratic self-government, he also urges that public discourse be 
managed so as to improve its "quality and diversity."53 Like all modern 
proponents of the collectivist theory, therefore, Sunstein is rendered 
vulnerable to the charge of internal inconsistency. 
Although a complete survey of the literature is beyond the scope 
of this article, it can generally be said that proponents of the collectivist 
theory, in a sincere and admirable effort o rejuvenate democratic self- 
governance, argue that public discourse should be regulated so as to 
achieve some specific ideal associated with a particular view of national 
identity, ranging from "equality" to "diversity" to "fairness."54 But to 
the extent that the managerial logic of the collectivist heory requires 
that these regulatory criteria be themselves exempt from the logic of 
self-determination, the theory stands in essential tension with funda- 
mental premises of democratic self-governance. 
51. Less debatable, perhaps, is the claim that, under conditions characteristic of 
the modern bureaucratic state, democratic self-governance would be impossible in the 
absence of a public discourse that is, in relevant respects, free and unfettered. 
52. Cass R. Sunstein, "Free Speech Now," University ofChicago Law Review 59 (1992): 
255-316, pp. 263, 313-14. 
53. Ibid., pp. 277, 303-4, 277. 
54. Equality: J. Skelly Wright, "Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First 
Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?" Columbia Law Review 82 (1982): 609-45, 
pp. 625-26. Diversity: Julian N. Eule, "Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro 
Broadcasting," Supreme Court Review (1990), pp. 105-32, 111-16; Judith Lichtenberg, 
"Foundations and Limits of Freedom of the Press," in Lichtenberg, ed., pp. 102-36. 
Fairness: Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Re- 
cent Experience, Public Choice Theory, and the First Amendment," UCLA Law Review 
29 (1982): 505-641, p. 515. 
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To avoid this contradiction, proponents of the collectivist heory 
emphasize the circumstances where public discourse cannot convinc- 
ingly be said to realize the values of self-governance and, therefore, 
where the managerial logic of the collectivist heory does not contradict 
basic democratic premises. They properly focus our attention on three 
propositions: (1) public discourse serves the value of self-governance 
only when there is a plausible public/private distinction; (2) public 
discourse serves the value of self-governance only when public debate 
can plausibly be regarded as an exchange among free and autonomous 
persons; and (3) public discourse serves the value of self-governance 
only when public debate engenders the sense of participation, legiti- 
macy, and identification necessary to reconcile individual with collec- 
tive autonomy. 
Each of these propositions spotlights a vulnerable link between 
public discourse and the value of self-determination. Where any of 
these links is broken, the focus of traditional First Amendment juris- 
prudence on autonomy is rendered problematic, and the collectivist 
theory emerges as a powerful alternative account of freedom of 
speech. 
A 
Traditional First Amendment doctrine presupposes some form of a 
public/private distinction. It locates the essence of democracy in self- 
determination, which inheres in the responsiveness of government to 
its citizens. The thrust of the doctrine is thus to protect from "public" 
regulation the communicative processes of "private" citizens deemed 
necessary for self-governance.55 The doctrine has rather little to say, 
however, about government speech itself, which is not theorized as 
central to self-determination.56 When, therefore, a speaker crosses the 
divide from private citizen to public functionary, she passes beyond 
the scope of traditional First Amendment doctrine. In such circum- 
stances the collectivist theory offers an attractive alternative account 
of First Amendment standards for regulating the speech of public 
functionaries. 
55. I enclose in quotation marks the adjectives 'public' and 'private' to avoid seman- 
tic confusion with the obviously very different meaning of the term 'public' in the phrase 
'public discourse.' The distinction between public discourse and nonpublic speech tracks 
the boundary between the speech of persons in their role as citizens and the speech of 
persons in other aspects of their lives. On the location and nature of that boundary, 
see Post, "The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse," pp. 667-84. The public/ 
private distinction at issue in text, however, refers to the boundary between government 
and its citizens. These common but different usages of the terms 'public' and 'private' 
allow us to assert, without fear of anomaly, that "private" citizens can engage in "public" 
discourse. Needless to say, our vocabulary in this area deserves a good scrubbing. 
56. See, generally, Mark G. Yudof, When Government Speaks: Politics, Law, and Gov- 
ernment Expression in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
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This can plainly be seen in the one decision of the Supreme 
Court that unambiguously relies on the collectivist theory, Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC.57 At issue in Red Lion was the constitutionality 
of various Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations of 
the broadcast media, including the fairness doctrine and subsidiary 
rules requiring that those personally attacked be given a right to reply. 
The Court held that because "broadcast frequencies constituted a 
scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only 
by the Government," and because those frequencies were "a public 
trust," a broadcast licensee could appropriately be regarded "as a proxy 
or fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which 
are representative of his community and which would otherwise, by 
necessity, be barred from the airwaves."58 
Broadcast licensees, in other words, were not private parties 
whose views were to be shielded from government regulation out of 
respect for the indeterminacy of their contribution to the communica- 
tive process of self-determination. They were instead agents of a public 
objective. The Court appealed to a collectivist theory of speech to 
specify this objective, which it characterized as "the First Amendment 
goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own 
affairs."59 The Court had no difficulty finding that the fairness doctrine 
instrumentally served this goal.60 
The Court's embrace of the collectivist theory was thus made 
possible by its characterization of broadcast licensees as public func- 
tionaries. This characterization could not plausibly have been driven 
by the logic of scarcity; even at the time of Red Lion there were in 
most media markets many more frequencies available than had actu- 
ally been allocated for use by FCC regulation.6' And in any event 
57. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
58. Ibid., pp. 376,383,389. See also ibid.: "It does not violate the First Amendment 
to treat licensees given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as proxies for 
the entire community, obligated to give suitable time and attention to matters of great 
public concern" (p. 394). 
59. Ibid., p. 392. 
60. Ibid., p. 390. "To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness 
to present representative community views on controversial issues is consistent with the 
ends and purposes of those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press" (ibid., p. 394). For a contrary view, see 
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amendment (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1987). Powe concludes that "the regulation of broadcasting has 
been characterized by the very abuses -favoritism, censorship, political influence -that 
the First Amendment was designed to prevent in the print media" ("Scholarship and 
Markets," George Washington Law Review 56 [1987]: 172-86, p. 185). 
61. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 398 n.25. On the theoretical 
and empirical inadequacy of the scarcity rationale, see Daniel D. Polbsy, "Candidate 
Access to the Air: The Uncertain Future of Broadcaster Discretion," Supreme Court 
Review (1981), pp. 223-62, 256-62. 
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neither we nor the Court ordinarily regard the owners of scarce im- 
portant communicative resources, like major metropolitan newspa- 
pers, as for that reason public agents.62 The Court's characterization 
must instead be understood as reflecting a political judgment about 
whether the broadcast media were sufficiently independent from gov- 
ernment to be regarded as private participants in the project of self- 
determination.63 Unfortunately the Court never convincingly spelled 
out the rationale for its judgment, and our ability to assess the validity 
of such evaluations remains quite rudimentary. 
This has not prevented some modern proponents of the collectiv- 
ist theory from attempting to generalize from Red Lion. They argue 
that the collectivist heory is justified because the public/private distinc- 
tion can have little persuasive applicability to the modern world. Thus 
Fiss writes that not only can the Columbia Broadcasting System "be 
said to perform a public function" (and therefore to be "a composite 
of the public and private"), but the "same is true of the print media, 
as it is of all corporations, unions, universities, and political organiza- 
tions."' In fact, Fiss concludes, "the social world is largely constituted 
by entities that partake of both the public and private."65 
Fiss's argument illustrates the danger of confusing descriptive and 
political accounts of the public/private distinction. His characterization 
is no doubt descriptively accurate, but the public/private distinction 
turns on questions of moral and political ascription. What is politically 
at issue in characterizing a speaker as public or private is precisely the 
scope of self-government. To repudiate the private status of speakers 
in the wholesale manner proposed by Fiss would necessarily entail an 
equally sweeping rejection of the realm of democratic self-determina- 
tion. And this would be inconsistent with the very value of self-gover- 
nance that Fiss concedes to be at the root of the collectivist heory. 
The point, therefore, is that while particular applications of the 
collectivist heory may be sustained through local adjustments of the 
62. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). But see Jerome 
A. Barron, "Law and the Free Society Lectures: Access-the Only Choice for the 
Media?" Texas Law Review 48 (1970): 766-90, p. 775. 
63. Justice Brennan understood this quite clearly when, four years later, he con- 
cluded that the actions of broadcast licensees constituted "governmental action" (Colum- 
bia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 180 
[1973] [Brennan,J., dissenting]). Brennan reached this conclusion "because the Govern- 
ment 'has so far insinuated itself into a position' of participation" in the policies of 
licensees "as to make the Government itself responsible for [their] effects" (p. 181, 
n. 12). The majority of the Court, however, refused to follow Brennan's lead, thus rele- 
gating Red Lion's holding to a confused fixation on physical scarcity. 
64. Fiss, "Free Speech and Social Structure," p. 1414. 
65. Ibid. For aguments with a similar tendency, see Cass R. Sunstein, "Legal In- 
terference with Private Preferences," University of Chicago Law Review 53 (1986): 1129- 
74, and "Free Speech Now," pp. 277, 288; Eule, pp. 113-14. 
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boundary between private citizens and public functionaries, the collec- 
tivist theory cannot be generically justified by this method without 
profoundly revising contemporary notions of democratic legitimacy. 
B 
Public discourse merits unique constitutional protection because it is 
the process through which the democratic "self," the agent of self- 
government, is itself constituted through the reconciliation of indi- 
vidual and collective autonomy. Constitutional solicitude for public 
discourse, therefore, presupposes that those participating in public 
discourse are free and autonomous. Public discourse could not serve 
the project of self-determination if the opinions and attitudes of speak- 
ers were deemed to be merely the effects of external causes. In the 
absence of freedom, therefore, the collectivist theory is no longer 
inconsistent with democratic values. 
Advocates of the collectivist theory commonly attempt to justify 
their position by stressing that public discourse cannot now plausibly 
be interpreted as an arena of free communicative exchange. Thus 
Julian Eule, using a metaphor popular among proponents of the col- 
lectivist theory, argues that limitations on campaign finance expendi- 
tures are necessary because the voices of the wealthy "drown out the 
voices of others."66 The metaphor serves a double function. At one 
level it expresses the normative criterion-"ensuring that the public 
is exposed to a broad array of views"-that Eule believes ought to be 
managerially used to regulate public discourse.67 At a deeper level the 
metaphor serves the additional function of justifying the creation of 
this managerial authority. Eule specifically tells us that "the extent to 
which a well-financed corporate speaker can dominate the 'market- 
place' has little to do with the persuasiveness of the speech."68 Eule's 
point is thus that the perspectives of those engaged in public discourse 
are physically caused by such variables as the quantity of speech that 
money can buy and, hence, that such perspectives cannot be regarded 
as the freely adopted conclusions of rational agents. Managerial con- 
trol is justified because the freedom necessary to link public discourse 
to self-determination has vanished. 
This loss of freedom is also explicit in the work of Fiss, who writes 
that the market is "a structure of constraint" and that regulation is 
necessary "to counteract the skew of public debate attributable to the 
market."69 The denial of autonomy is most developed, however, in 
the arguments of Cass Sunstein. Sunstein sets rigorous standards 
66. Eule, p. 115. 
67. Ibid., p. 112. 
68. Ibid., p. 113. 
69. Fiss, "Why the State?" pp. 787-88. 
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for the ascription of autonomy: "The notion of autonomy should re- 
fer ... to decisions reached with a full and vivid awareness of available 
opportunities, with reference to all relevant information, and without 
illegitimate or excessive constraints on preference formation. When 
these conditions are not met, decisions should be described as unfree 
or nonautonomous."70 Sunstein finds it "most difficult" to deem "indi- 
vidual freedom" relevant when attitudes "are a product of available 
information, existing consumption patterns, social pressures, and gov- 
ernmental rules."7' In fact individual attitudes should "be regarded 
as nonautonomous insofar as they are reflexively adaptive to unjust 
background conditions."72 Government regulation to overcome such 
conditions "removes a kind of coercion."73 Sunstein proposes far-reach- 
ing reforms to subordinate public discourse to managerial control,74 
and these reforms are ultimately justified by his equally far-reaching 
denial of the relevance of individual autonomy. 
The denial of freedom poses a fundamental and complex chal- 
lenge to traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. We know that 
human beings, like all natural objects, are subject to laws of cause and 
effect. As social science grows more sophisticated, we can expect better 
to understand, predict, and control the manifold ways in which cultural 
environment affects and determines social behavior, including speech 
and attitude formation. This knowledge, however, is deeply incompati- 
ble with the very premise of democratic self-government. Members of 
the polity, regarded only through the lens of social or natural science, 
cease to be citizens; they are visible only as effects of complex and 
multifarious causes. Citizenship thus presupposes the attribution of 
freedom. The ascription of autonomy is in this sense the transcenden- 
tal precondition for the possibility of democratic self-determination. 
I appreciate the paradoxical quality of this conclusion. We often 
speak of autonomy as a condition that needs to be attained through 
education, nurturance, the ameliorization of disabling circumstances, 
and so forth. This is the perspective from which Sunstein writes, and 
it implies that autonomy must be achieved rather than ascribed. But 
this perspective can be misleading when it comes to the design of 
structures of social authority, for the nature of such structures will 
depend upon whether they are intended to foster interactions among 
citizens who are autonomous or, instead, among citizens who are not. 
From the point of view of the designer of the structure, therefore, 
the presence or absence of autonomy functions as an axiomatic and 
70. Sunstein, "Preferences and Politics," p. 11. 
7 1. Ibid. 
72. Ibid., p. 21. 
73. Ibid., p. 12. 
74. Ibid., pp. 27-32. 
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foundational principle.75 Managerial structures locate citizens within 
the constraints of instrumental reason, assuming therefore that citi- 
zens are objects of regulation, subject to the laws of cause and effect. 
Structures of self-governance, in contrast, situate citizens within webs 
of hermeneutic interactions, assuming therefore that citizens are au- 
tonomous and self-determining. 
In most circumstances we find ways of finessing this tension be- 
tween management and democracy. The explosive expansion of the 
regulatory state during the twentieth century, for example, has been 
fueled by acceptance and application of the insights of social science. 
Through sophisticated forms of social engineering we manipulate the 
conditions of our environment, including the persons who inhabit 
it. We do not regard these government controls as fundamentally 
incompatible with the premises of democratic freedom because we 
conceive them to have been freely adopted by the citizens of a demo- 
cratic state. Analogous managerial controls over public discourse, how- 
ever, cannot be conceptualized as democratically legitimate in the same 
way, for they displace the process of collective self-determination. To 
conceive public discourse as a realm of causation, and to use this 
conception to justify regulating public discourse in ways incompatible 
with its democratic purpose, is therefore directly and uncompromis- 
ingly to challenge the last redoubt of self-governance. 
Like the public/private distinction, therefore, the concept of au- 
tonomy must function within public discourse as a moral ascription 
that marks the boundaries of our commitment to democratic self- 
government. For this reason the denial of freedom within public dis- 
course cannot generically justify the collectivist heory of speech with- 
out contradicting the central premise of our democratic enterprise. At 
most, autonomy can be negated in discrete and local ways where First 
Amendment presumptions of autonomy have come to seem merely 
"fictions" masking particularly intolerable conditions of private power 
and domination.76 The maintenance of democratic legitimacy, how- 
ever, requires that sufficient domains of public discourse remain gov- 
erned by presumptions of freedom so as meaningfully to realize our 
commitment to self-government. 
75. John Stuart Mill understood this clearly when in On Liberty he refused to 
support limitations on "beer and spirit houses," despite disturbing evidence of their 
uncontrolled abuse among members of the working class, because such limitations 
would be "suited only to a state of society in which the laboring classes are avowedly 
treated as children or savages, and placed under an education of restraint, to fit them 
for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not a principle on which the 
laboring classes are professedly governed in any free country" (On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth 
Rapaport [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978], p. 100). 
76. The term 'fictions' is Eule's, pp. 129-30. 
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The consequence of this conclusion is apparent in the work of 
J. Skelly Wright, who yields to none in the vehemence of his denuncia- 
tion of the "stifling influence of money" that perverts "the minds of 
the people" and thus has "a powerful impact" on the outcome of 
electoral campaigns.77 Yet Wright's proposed remedy is discrete and 
limited: "An election campaign is finite in time and focuses on specific 
ballot decisions regarding specific alternatives. Expenditure limits and 
other curbs on campaign finance practices are analogous to rules of 
order at a town meeting, enforced so that the deliberative process is 
not distorted. The first amendment does not permit curbs on general 
discussion of political, economic, or social controversies. But, like the 
loud mouth and long talker at the town meeting, untrammeled spend- 
ing during an election campaign does not serve the values of self- 
government."78 As Eule, Fiss, and Sunstein all plainly understand, 
wealth has equally powerful and stifling effects on the "general discus- 
sion of political, economic, or social controversies" as it does on election 
campaigns. But Wright recognizes that public discourse cannot be 
subject to generic managerial control without concomitantly sacrificing 
central First Amendment values. He therefore embraces a distinction 
that is, from an empirical point of view, merely arbitrary. But so long 
as the political function of the attribution of autonomy is kept clearly 
in mind, some such empirically arbitrary limitation will be necessary 
whenever autonomy is denied to justify employment of the collectivist 
theory of freedom of speech. 
An important practical implication of this analysis is that the crite- 
ria we use to locate autonomy must be politically calibrated by their 
implications for the value of self-determination. Thus, for example, 
Sunstein's rigorous preconditions for autonomy are plainly unaccept- 
able for use in the First Amendment context. They are far too stringent 
practically to apply to the rough-and-tumble world of actual politics. 
Applied literally, they would reserve self-government for philosopher- 
kings. Applied loosely, they would tie the qualification for self-govern- 
ment directly to political perspective and, hence, constitute an open 
invitation to exclude the communicative contributions of those whose 
views are deemed "reflexively adaptive to unjust background condi- 
tions."79 Similarly, Fiss's attribution of coercion to the constraints of 
the capitalist social structure is too vague and indiscriminate to coexist 
peacefully with the value of collective self-determination. 
To be frank, I am uncertain whether appropriate criteria of au- 
tonomy can ever be satisfactorially established, for the tension between 
77. Wright, pp. 636, 625, 622. 
78. Ibid., p. 639. 
79. Thus Sunstein concludes that First Amendment protection ought not to be 
extended to pornography or hate speech because they "have serious and corrosive effects 
on beliefs and desires" ("Preferences and Politics," pp. 31-32). 
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democracy and the attempt to justify the collectivist heory by denying 
the autonomy of citizens is so very fundamental. One cannot but be 
struck by the sharp anomaly of regulating democratic elections on the 
premise that voters are not autonomous and free. It is hard to imagine 
what kind of an empirical showing could ever suffice to overcome the 
internal disequilibrium of such a position. And there will always be 
disturbing possibilities for manipulation and abuse in sanctioning the 
exclusion of categories of citizens from the polity because of their 
ascribed lack of freedom. Without denying in principle that such exclu- 
sions may be necessary or desirable, I would emphasize that a demo- 
cratic state can tolerate them only in the most unusual and limited of 
circumstances. 
C 
Both the repudiation of the public/private distinction and the denial of 
autonomy are arguments exogenous to traditional First Amendment 
jurisprudence. They attempt to clear a space for the application of 
the collectivist heory by negating axiomatic foundations for the appli- 
cation of established First Amendment doctrine. There is yet a third 
argument for the collectivist theory, however, which adopts a stance 
that is internal to the received First Amendment tradition. 
This argument begins from the premise that public discourse 
serves the value of self-government because it engenders the sense 
of participation, identification, and legitimacy necessary to reconcile 
individual with collective autonomy. Even if public discourse is for- 
mally free, it cannot fulfill this function if the actual practices of public 
debate cause citizens to experience alienation or disaffection. A demo- 
cratic state must combat these effects if public discourse is to sustain 
the value of self-determination. This effort may even require the sub- 
ordination of specific aspects of public discourse to managerial control. 
The internal argument for the collectivist heory is visible in the 
work of Wright, who observes that election campaigns, even if formally 
free, cannot fulfill their democratic function if they are experienced 
by citizens as distant, unresponsive, and dominated by wealth. Wright 
astutely cautions "that it is hazardous to discourage civic spirit, hope, 
and participation; that disillusionment breeds alienation; that alien- 
ation breeds apathy; that apathy menaces the democratic idea."80 He 
therefore defends campaign expenditure limitations as a means of 
fulfilling the very values that lie at the core of the received First 
Amendment tradition. 
Because the internal argument for the collectivist theory re- 
mains firmly anchored in the values of participation and self-deter- 
mination, it does not imply that the collectivist theory ought gener- 
80. Ibid., p. 638. 
81. In this sense the internal argument displays a structure of analysis similar to 
what I have elsewhere identified as the "paradox of public discourse" ("The Constitu- 
tional Concept of Public Discourse"). 
82. Wright, p. 609. 
83. See, e.g., Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979); Sunstein, "Legal Interference with Private Preferences." For a critique of 
the political use of the metaphor, see Jonathan Schonsheck, "Deconstructing Commu- 
nity Self-Paternalism," Law and Philosophy 10 (1991): 29-50. 
676 Ethics July 1993 
ally to displace traditional interpretations of the First Amendment. 
It instead forces us to confront the possibility that the achievement 
of democratic values may, in discrete circumstances, require care- 
fully bounded structures of managerial control.8' The narrow objec- 
tive of such structures must be the correction of the conditions that 
cause severe citizen disaffection. 
So, for example, Wright believes that civic alienation from elec- 
toral campaigns has been caused by flagrant violations of "the ideal 
of equality," and he argues that campaign speech ought to be man- 
aged so as to instantiate that ideal.82 Wright understands, however, 
that even such a beneficent purpose does not alter the fact that 
citizens subject to managerial control become the heteronomous 
objects of regulation. His use of the internal argument thus leads 
Wright to cede priority of place to democratic values, thereby check- 
ing the slippage, so apparent in the recent work of Fiss and Sunstein, 
toward a disturbing loss of serious engagement with the ideal of 
collective self-government. Wright clearly sees that the organized 
structure of an election campaign, like the analogous structure of 
a town meeting, must remain a narrowly bounded island within a 
more general and uncensored sea of "discussion of political, eco- 
nomic, or social controversies." 
It seems to me better to use a spatial metaphor to express such 
a limited suspension of autonomous self-determination than the more 
common temporal image that may, for example, be found in the often 
retold parable of Ulysses and the Sirens.83 Well-known dynamics of 
power suggest that in actual practice managerial displacements of 
self-governance are unlikely to be temporary. And certainly the total 
partition of public discourse from the value of self-determination, 
however limited in duration, would be unacceptable in a democratic 
state. In this sense the spatial metaphor properly focuses attention on 
the relationship between discrete areas of managerial control and the 
general health of ongoing and free processes of communication. The 
spatial metaphor, in contrast to the temporal image used to discuss 
the suspension of the autonomy of individuals, thus emphasizes the 
necessarily ancillary and subordinate character of the managerial regu- 
lation of a specific communicative process. 
Post Managing Deliberation 677 
According to the internal argument for the collectivist theory, 
managerial control of discrete domains of public discourse can be 
justified only by the most pressing necessity, which the internal argu- 
ment comprehends in terms of circumstances rendering the formal 
conditions of freedom inimical to the achievement of democratic legiti- 
macy. Only a democracy mesmerized by formal freedom could fail to 
be alarmed by such circumstances. But the internal argument also 
demands that we face unflinchingly the paradox entailed by establish- 
ing structures of managerial control that violate formal conditions of 
freedom in order to recuperate democratic values. Such structures 
necessarily lose what they hope to achieve. They may thus be accept- 
able for acts of local rehabilitation but, if generally imposed, would 
frustrate the very raison d'etre of the democratic enterprise. 
We are thus thrown into a world of inconsistency and compromise, 
the unhappy home of both politics and constitutional adjudication. 
Our main hope is to keep clearly in view the values that ought to 
guide our judgment, including and especially the painful conflicts 
among them. Because its principled application will enforce this di- 
vided awareness, the internal argument for the collectivist heory of 
the First Amendment seems to me the theory's most attractive constitu- 
tional justification. 
IV 
Contemporary advocates of the collectivist theory, by contrast, tend 
enthusiastically and uncritically to endorse the theory as a beneficent 
extension of the progressive, regulatory state. Resistance to the theory 
is attributed to Lochnerism,4 to a nostalgic fixation on long-lost Jeffer- 
sonian independence.85 The modern world, we are told, demands a 
sterner realism, an acknowledgement of pervasive and complex con- 
figurations of constraint and heteronomy that can only be mastered 
through active state intervention. 
State intervention, however, implies managerial control, and we 
ought not to be quite so quick to embrace a world of "undeviating 
organization" (as members of the Frankfurt school would characterize 
it).86 The nightmare vision of Michel Foucault demonstrates clearly 
enough the true nature of such a world. Structures of control acquire 
their own life, turn, and bite the progressive hand that establishes 
them. If we create organizations of heteronomy, we shall all, sooner 
84. See David Yassky, "Eras of the First Amendment," Columbia Law Review 91 
(1991): 1699-1755; Cass R. Sunstein, "Lochner's Legacy," Columbia Law Review 87 
(1987): 873-919, pp. 883-84. 
85. Fiss, "Free Speech and Social Structure," p. 1412. 
86. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, rans. 
John Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1972), p. 87. 
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or later, be condemned to inhabit them. We shall become the subjects 
of a power not our own. 
I do not mean to imply that government regulation does not have 
its necessary uses. There is no "natural" social order, and government 
management is indispensable to achieve our desired purposes and 
ends. Indeed, a public discourse that did not ultimately establish mana- 
gerial organizations designed to attain publically decided objectives 
would be merely impotent.87 More is at stake in the regulation of 
public discourse, however, than the simple question of laissez-faire. 
Traditional First Amendment doctrine, with its quaint focus on auton- 
omy and the indeterminacy of national identity, is one of the last 
remaining areas of constitutional aw seriously to engage the project 
of self-determination. If we discard that project as childish myth, so 
do we also discard our commitment to democracy, at least as our 
constitutional tradition has so far understood democracy. 
Perhaps that understanding is now ripe for revision. If some are 
indeed prepared to abandon the Enlightenment framework that has 
so far governed our appreciation of democratic legitimacy, the debate 
should be joined directly, and not crabwise, through the unconscious 
evisceration of the very values in whose name we still purport to act. 
Certainly in the absence of a convincing alternative normative account 
of democracy, we ought not willingly and cheerfully to abandon our 
last vestigial commitments to the project of collective independence 
and freedom, even for the most beguiling visions of progressive re- 
form. The collectivist theory of freedom of speech, therefore, while 
useful in subordinate and limited ways, should not displace traditional 
First Amendment jurisprudence. We should reserve the theory for 
those discrete and hopefully rare moments when its use is necessary 
to sustain the enterprise of self-governance that continues at least 
nominally to claim our allegiance. 
87. See Post, "The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse," pp. 684-85. 
